Can the admissibility of evidence be affected by questions asked without reasonable grounds under section 139?

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Can the admissibility of evidence be affected by questions asked without reasonable grounds under section 139? It is well known in this country that hearsay evidence is admissible prior to a conviction. (Commonwealth v. Gaddis (1990) 223 Pa.Cmwlth. 704, 675 A.2d 1405 (Gaddis).) The Supreme Court has said that the admissibility of hearsay evidence is permissible without being guided by that applicable to the admissibility of evidence received. (Evid. Code, § 263; Commonwealth v. Hefe (1989) 490 Pa.

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337, 346, 39 A.3d 732; Commonwealth v. Kallman (1980) 101 Conn. App. 393, 400, 700 A.2d 73). In determining whether hearsay evidence is admissible, it is properly confined to one the admissibility rules, yet generally must be applied to any evidence admissible in one of two situations: (1) to prove a fact in issue; (2) to prove the basis for the finding for a judgment; (3) to establish the accused’s intent in making the decision to plead guilty. (Commonwealth v. Jackson (1974) 226 Pa.Cmwlth. 31, 508 A.2d 1315 (“Particular practice does not apply to the admissible evidence underlying the prior conviction. For purposes of section 139, these authorities are complete and sufficient to create an exception to this rule. That testimony is not protected and does not violate due process, but only hearsay evidence is admissible to prove the defendant’s intent.”). Commonwealth v. Salley (1979) 542 Pa. 330, 844 A.2d 1045 (H.Sh.

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1994). In the instant case, I contend that the introduction of the admissibility evidence (I shall refer to the Commonwealth’s evidence) is one of two types: (1) evidence of defendant’s need for relief; or (2) evidence of the defendant’s intent to deprive the plaintiff of his parole. I cannot accept defendant’s answer to the first three questions to find a motive for the instant conviction. Under I.R.E. 404(b); I.R.E. 404(c). Commonwealth v. Gray (1988) 231 Pa.Cmwlth. 127, 530 A.2d 553, and Commonwealth v. Taylor (1985) 173 Pa.Cmwlth. 762, 495 A.2d 506. While I suspect the Commonwealth intends to use its offer as evidence of defendant’s knowing intent to deprive the plaintiff of his parole, I cannot be certain that it is such proof of a purpose for which the Commonwealth has offered to prove the defendant’s actual intent.

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The admissibility of an admissible hearsay offering falls within the first and second categories I have described, because the facts of a prior incident constitute a mere surplusage of evidence. When two offers under the same circumstantial proof used to adduce evidence are combined, the fact that one is less probative than the other does not give rise to the presumption of any purpose for which evidence is offered. However, the fact that the admissibility of certain exhibits is based upon the same evidence is not of such significance that the witness’s inference of a particular purpose can be considered highly unreasonable. The fact that it may require the state to prove a motive by the witness or for other evidence to get the case countered, or that the inference may be a part of the witness’s prerogative, gives rise to a presumption that his honest belief may be considered reliable, even if the statements are false-in-fact. Commonwealth v. Thomas (1987) 195 Va. 763, 111 S.E.2d 638; Commonwealth v. Ross (1989) 414 Pa. 33, 340-41, 299 A.2d 664(Ross); Commonwealth v. Tiller (1974) 377 A.2d